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Professor Elizabeth M. Iglesias*: Welcome to the joint
program of the Section on Labor Relations and Employment
Law and Section on Minority Groups, and Happy New Year.
You know from the materials in the AALS conference program
overview that the purpose of this panel is to examine the

structure and practices organizing work in the legal academy.
This means assessing the extent to which labor practices in

the academy comply with basic requirements of U.S. labor
and employment laws, as well as the extent to which these
laws really address the kinds of discriminatory practices
pervasive in the academy, and the kind of reform efforts

needed to promote equal opportunity and academic freedom.
This is an important project because the conditions and
structures of work impact directly on the ability of the

academy to achieve its objectives. It is also a project that
needs to be approached from a multidimensional perspective.
This multidimensional approach is necessary because
many practices in the legal academy reflect the impact of its
important role in the reproduction of elites. By this I refer to
the internal "elite" hierarchies that organize power within and

across particular academic institutions as well as the
external corporate and governmental hierarchies for which
the legal academy performs the important function of
certifying elites. As a result, the terms and conditions of
work, as well as the opportunities for work, both within the

law school and throughout the legal profession, reflect a wide
range of factors that oftentimes undermine both academic
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Section Chair and
Program Chair of the AALS Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law.

129

130

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:129

freedom and equal opportunity, as well as undermining the
broader project of producing lawyers equipped to practice law
for social justice.
Needless to say, any assessment of the ways in which the
terms and conditions of work in the academy impact the
objectives of legal education depends in part on the position
we take on what the objectives of legal education are or
should be. It will depend on whether we think, for example,
that legal education is about individual advancement through
professional education - i.e. that the purpose of legal
education is to enable individuals to access a certain social
status and standard of living or whether we think the
purpose of legal education is something else. This is because
the "appropriate" way to organize legal education looks very
different if it's about individual self-actualization or instead
about producing inputs for preexisting hierarchies already
entrenched in law firms and government agencies or
alternatively about ensuring that society has the necessary
human resources to enforce the rights of subordinated and
disenfranchised people - both within and outside of the
academy. It will look different, yet again, if the purpose of the
academy ought to be to secure a place where we collectively
can imagine alternatives very different from existing realities
- new legal institutions, substantive norms, and procedures
that need to be imagined, developed and implemented in
order to achieve broad social objectives such as "the common
good." Each of these different perspectives produces very
different reactions to curricular debates about how much
theory and what kind of theory and how much practice and
what kind of practice ought to be taught in the law schools;
appointments debates about the need for "diversity" within
the faculty; admissions debates regarding the kinds of
investments law schools should be willing to make in opening
up access to legal education to historically excluded groups;
and a whole range of other issues.
Thus, a good place to start any multidimensional analysis
of the terms and conditions of work in the legal academy is to
recognize the political and ideological
commitments
underpinning different accounts of the purposes of legal
education because these different commitments are directly
linked to the way we approach debates over who should be
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admitted to law school, how and what they should be taught,
by whom, and with what end in mind. Or put differently,
dominant political and ideological commitments have a direct
impact on how we answer questions about the way work in
the academy should be organized.
Thus, any effort to
transform the terms and conditions of work in the academy
will have to examine the underlying political, ideological and
sometimes the more directly transparent self interests of
those in control of individual law schools and other
institutions whose interests are implicated in, and affected
by, the organization of legal education.
Today's program has been organized precisely to bring us
multiple perspectives from which to examine the structures
and practices organizing work in the legal academy.
A
comprehensive analysis needs to examine both the external
forces competing for control of the legal academy, as well as
the internal competition for power and prestige (or simple
survival) that often is expressed in what I will call the
"micropolitics" of the academy. The impact of external forces
on such critical matters as admissions, appointments, oncampus recruiting and curriculum is readily apparent in the
way law schools respond to such things as their rankings in
U.S. News and World Report; bar passage rates; the demands
of the organized bar; the policies and priorities of private
foundations and government funding sources. Not all law
schools respond in the same way to these forces. This is in
part because these forces are not always configured in the
same way at each institution and in part because, as Dean
Pershbacher will tell us, leadership matters. The leadership
abilities at the highest level of a law school's administration
can and do make a difference in the way these external forces
impact a law school's commitment to diversity, inclusiveness,
and the preparation of students to practice law for social
justice.
A comprehensive analysis also needs to take into account
the way the internal micropolitics of the law school impact
the conditions of work at individual institutions, and thus, in
turn, the institution's ability to create an environment that
fosters the success and maximizes the creative potential of
students and faculty. As Professor Carbado points out,
faculty of color oftentimes find themselves caught in a variety
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of catch-22s as a result of the racial stereotypes through
which their priorities and perspectives are interpreted by
some of their colleagues. These interpretative practices are
part of the micropolitics through which dominant factions
within any particular institution seek to legitimate
exclusionary policies, protect their own privileged "turfs,"
suppress innovations deemed threatening to their individual
status and power within the institution and otherwise reduce
the law school's potential for growth and excellence. While
good leadership at the top would be welcome at every law
school, it is not always available, and in such instances,
Professor Montoya's presentation offers much by way of
practical advice for untenured newcomers to the academy
seeking ways to survive and preferably to thrive in
environments that are in some instances positively hostile to
their success.
Professor Durako's presentation offers us a very different
methodological approach to analyzing the organization of
work in the legal academy. Using a comprehensive empirical
analysis of salary differentials and the distribution of men
and women across faculty positions of varying status and
power, she raises important questions about the extent to
which law schools are failing to comply with the ABA's
exhortation to "maintain employment environments that are
free from both actionable discrimination and subtle barriers
to equal opportunity." The disproportionate employment of
women in untenured, contract positions of low status, little
power and unequal pay may provide a false diversity by way
of faculty rosters and group photo opportunities, but it does
little to provide for genuinely "equal" opportunity, and much
to expose law schools to potential liability.
Professor Olivas also focuses our attention on the
importance of avoiding actionable misconduct within the legal
academy, albeit from a different perspective informed
specifically by his experience handling cases of faculty
misconduct. There is no doubt that a key to the survival of
such traditions and institutions as tenure, academic freedom,
and the regulatory autonomy of legal academy depend on
self-regulation and faculty compliance with professional
standards of conduct and ethics. At the same time,
a
comprehensive analysis of the micropolitics of "enforcement"
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needs also to attend to the sorts of interpretative practices
addressed by Professor Carbado. The structure of power
within individual law schools can and too often does produce
differential interpretative and enforcement practices in which
gross misbehavior by entrenched or otherwise protected
faculty members is greeted with impunity, while even false
and unsubstantiated complaints against faculty of color can
trigger unwarranted "concerns," intrusive investigations and
disruptive hearings.
Providing yet another perspective, Professor Scherer's
presentation focuses our attention on the law school's duty to
provide the kinds of academic support needed to address the
unique race-based problems faced by students of color in
predominantly white law schools. Certainly the work students
do in law school should be included in any comprehensive
analysis of the structures and practices that organize work in
the legal academy. Too often academic support programs are
premised implicitly and sometimes at some schools even
explicitly on the supposed inferiority of students of color.
Professor Scherer's analysis does much to dispel this
assumption and challenges us to think critically about the
extent to which our law schools are really committed to
providing the kind of learning environment and programs
that can effectively train the wide diversity of students needed
to ensure the legal profession reflects the increasing diversity
of our society.
The presentation by Professor Schultz rounds out this
very exciting program. Throughout the program, a recurrent
theme is the question of how best to transform the structures
and reform practices that restrict opportunity, undermine
academic freedom, promote conformity, suppress innovation
and reproduce the entrenched power structures that
oftentimes maintain a stranglehold on a law school's potential
for excellence. Drawing on her expertise in the field of
employment discrimination law, and more specifically the law
dealing with hostile work environments involving women,
Professor Schultz invites us to consider the kinds of alliances
needed to combat the marginalization of minority students
Certainly, in the
and faculty within the legal academy.
absence of leadership from above, any change from below will
require the development of meaningful alliances among
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informed and concerned faculty, students, administrators
and alumni - directed both at the internal micropolitics
within individual law schools and at the external forces intent
on bending law schools to the service of elite agendas. These
alliances need to be multidimensional and inclusive of all who
are committed to social justice within, beyond and through
the organization of the legal academy.
This brief introduction should give you a flavor of the
kind of conversation we are hoping this program will trigger
and get you thinking about issues you may want to bring up
during the two question and answer periods. Our time frame
is from nine to twelve. We will hear from the first four
speakers on the program, and will hopefully have a full half
hour to discuss the issues they will raise. We'll then take a
five minute break - and continue with the next four
speakers. I'm listed as a speaker, but I'm going to break up
my twelve minutes in order to have two or three minutes after
the two panel presentations to get our discussions started.
So, with that said, Professor Durako has a slide presentation
and an introduction to the structural inequalities that define
the conditions of labor in the workplace.
A WOMAN'S PLACE: EMPLOYMENT PAT'ERNS IN LEGAL
WRITING
Professor Jo Anne Durako*: Thank you and good
morning. I'm Jo Anne Durako from Rutgers Law School, at
Camden, where I'm the Director of the Legal Writing Program.
I've been invited to join this panel today because of my
empirical studies on employment patterns in the legal writing
field. I published a recent article in the Journal of Legal
Education titled "Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto:
Gender Bias in Legal Writing."' My focus today is on an
aspect of segmentation of the academic labor market, the
legal writing field, and more specifically on how women legal
writing directors are treated less well within that field.
* Director of Legal Research and Writing, Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey School of Law, Camden.
1. Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in
Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUc. 562 (2000).
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My goal is to get the story of employment conditions in
the legal writing field and the supporting data out before a
larger audience. This topic has been discussed in legal
writing circles for about five years. My Journal of Legal
Education article was the first step to get part of that story
out to the legal academy. Today is a second step. I hope that
by sharing with this AALS section some of the statistics and
patterns and practices within the legal writing field that some
changes will begin.
Legal writing is called a pink ghetto. I have called it a
pink ghetto,' as have many other commentators.
Legal
writing is a pink ghetto because, while doctrinal law faculties
are over 70 percent male,' legal writing faculties are more
than 70 percent female.5 That is a significant difference. This
kind of occupational segregation is true among both the legal
writing teachers and legal writing directors where both
groups are 70 percent female.' I took the term "pink ghetto"
from the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession,
Elusive Equality report. The 1996 report called on law
schools to "maintain employment environments that are free
of both actionable discrimination and subtle barriers to equal
opportunity that operate to create a 'pink ghetto' for women
faculty."7 I believe, as do others, that just such a pink ghetto
has been created in legal writing. In fact, there's a poem
entitled "Pink Ghetto" that was published in the 1999 Yale
Journal of Law and Feminism," recounting the experience of
being a legal writing teacher. In short, legal writing is a pink
ghetto because the highest concentration of women in the
legal academy is in legal writing. We even exceed the
proportion of women among assistant deans; women are only
2. See id. at 563.
3. See e.g., ABA COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION 4 (1996) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION]; Jan M. Levine, Leveling the Hill of Sisyphus: Becoming a Professor of
Legal Writing, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (1999); Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal
Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A SharperImage, 2 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 19
(1996).
4. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics
Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 322, tbl.7 (2000).
5. See Durako, supra note 1, at 562-63.
6. It's interesting that there are not more male legal writing directors. That's
something I would have expected to find, but that's not the case.
7. WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 3, at 32-33.
8. Susan Ayres, Pink Ghetto, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1,2 (1999).
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69 percent of assistant deans. 9 We're not particularly proud

of that, but those are the employment statistics in American
law schools for the past several years.
My study of a small group of approximately one hundred
legal writing directors in American law schools provides some
useful insights about how law schools have structured their
faculties.

The study shows law schools have developed a

false gender diversity by adding women to their faculty in
legal writing programs while segregating them and treating
them like second-class citizens. As a result, many of the
goals of gender diversity have been unfulfilled.
How did legal writing get to be a pink ghetto? In the
1970s, there was a sharp increase in the number of students
attending law schools and, during the same period, the
proportion of female law students increased dramatically. 0
Forward-thinking law schools, and I like to think of all law
schools as being forward-thinking, began to try to decrease
this gap between the composition of the student body and the
composition

of the faculty,

which was

then even

more

overwhelmingly male. Adding tenured and tenure-track
positions is a slow and expensive process, but adding women
in clinical positions and legal writing positions was far faster

and cheaper.

During the 1960s and 70s, clinics began to

grow and become

part of the legal academy.

By

1998,

approximately 50 percent of the clinicians, about half of the
800 clinicians," were women and, within legal writing, 70
percent of legal writing professionals were women.1 2 In the
early 1980s, at the beginning of the expansion of legal writing
faculties, only 48 percent of legal writing faculty were
female. 13 But by 1986, when there were about 208 legal
writing professionals in the country, approximately 68
percent of those legal writing professionals were women,

which is close to the 70 percent proportion today.1 4

These

statistics have been widely reported in national surveys that
I've conducted over the past several years, prior national
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Durako, supranote 1, at 562-63.
id. at 563-64.
id. at 564-65.
id at 562-63.
id. at 565.
id. at 562-63.
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surveys, and in other literatures such as Maureen Arrigo's
article, "Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in

Legal Writing Programs,

,15

and Pam Edwards' 1997 article,

"Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes
of the Academy."" This is a well studied phenomenon, that is
widely known - at least among legal writing professionals.
Individual decisions at over 180 law schools have resulted in
one area of law teaching being 70 percent female. This
employment structure has been in place for about fifteen
years.
That explains the creation of the pink ghetto, but how did
women legal writing directors become second-class citizens?
Women are a super-majority in the legal writing field, and in
the legal writing director positions. Yet women legal writing
directors earn lower salaries, have lower status, are less often
tenured, are less often called professor, and have fewer voting
rights then their males colleagues.17 Law schools have paid
women legal writing directors about 80 percent of their male
directors' salaries.' Law schools have awarded tenure to a
smaller portion of women. Approximately 45 percent of
women are hired on contract basis, whereas only about 30
percent of men are.19 Law schools less often assign women
the traditional legitimizing academic title of professor; about
59 percent of women have professor in their title, but about
76 percent of men do.
Law schools less often give women
teaching opportunities beyond the first-year of law school.
Fifty-five percent of women teach courses outside the firstyear curriculum, whereas about 82 percent of men teach
21
upper level courses.
Law schools less often give women voting rights in faculty
meetings and committees. For example, my 2000 survey
found that about 93 percent of women served on committees
and 81 percent voted, but 100 percent of men served on
20

15. Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained:Status and Gender Issues in Legal
Writing Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 117 (1997).
16. Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes
of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1997).
17. See Durako, supranote 1, at 562-63, 569, 575, 577.
18. See id. at 569.
19. See id. at 574-75.
20. See id. at 576.
21. See id.
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committees and 88 percent voted.2 2 In examining virtually all
the statistics related to salary and status, I found that men
were treated better than women directors. To the extent that
there was a good legal writing job, for example paying more
than $100,000 a year, being tenured, having voting rights,
having a broader range of teaching opportunities, more than
likely that job was held by a man.2
The result of women directors being considered secondclass citizens within their field is consistent with the
treatment of women in other groups in the legal academy.
When one looks at deans, associate deans and assistant
deans, and the hierarchy of professor, associate professor
and assistant professor, as the prestige and pay of a position
decrease the percentage of women in that position
increases.2 4
There's also a similar pattern of a higher
percentage of women in jobs with lower status among the
three areas of law teaching: doctrinal teaching, which has
about 26 percent women; 25 clinical teaching which has 50
percent women;26 and legal writing teaching, which has 70
percent women. Throughout the legal academy, a consistent
pattern emerges: the larger the percentage of women, the
lower the status of the job and the lower the pay.
The details of my study are in my article. I would like to
focus this morning on an illustrative example, salary
disparity between men and women legal writing directors. As
my legal writing colleague Richard Neumann wrote in his
article 'Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Say,"
"sometimes numbers tell us what adjectives and adverbs can
not." 28 I have some numbers that show three years of salary
comparisons from the national surveys of legal writing
programs around the country. 29 The surveys get over a 70
22. See id at 577.
23. See id. at 565-66.
24. See id. at 581.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Neumann supranote 4, at 313.
29. See Durako, supranote 1, at 569. The national writing surveys are posted on
the website of the Association of Legal Writing Directors, <http://www.
alwd.org/resources/survey-results.htm> (last visited July 29, 2002) [hereinafter
ALWD Surveys].
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percent response rate, resulting in very accurate data about
salaries paid in legal writing positions. From the salary
comparision from the 1999, 2000, and 2001 surveys, there is
a stark difference between male and female legal writing
directors' salaries. There is a very clear pattern of men
consistently reporting significantly higher salaries.
Chart 1
Comparison of Directors' Average Annual Salaries by
Gender

Male
Directors
Female
Directors
Difference

1999
$80,000

2000
87,410

2001
88,015

$67,331

$71,628

$75,971

$12,669

$15,782

$12,044

The first level of analysis was done by comparing mean
salaries. As a follow-up, I decided to do a regression analysis
because of questions about whether the salary differences
were caused by factors other than gender, such as men
having more experience. I did a regression analysis to isolate
the impact of gender on salaries that were paid by law
schools. I found a six-factor regression model that takes into
account: 1) years out of law school, 2) years of teaching
experience, 3) the number of personnel the director
supervises, 4) the number of students in an entering class,
5) whether a position is tenured or tenure-track, and 6)
gender. The model showed that being tenured or tenuretrack was the only variable that has more of an impact on
salary than the director's gender."o
Perhaps the best way to understand the effect of the six
variables on a legal writing director's salary is to look at the
operation of this regression model on a typical legal writing
director. From the national survey data, I found that a typical
legal writing director graduated from law school about
seventeen years ago, taught in law school about eleven years,
30. See id. at 571.
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and supervised about four people at a law school with about
two hundred students in its entering class. Coincidentally, I
happen to be a good example of a typical writing director. I'm
female and have a non-tenure track position, so I'm typical of
about 70 percent of the writing directors
If you look at this equation regression, you'll see the
significant contribution to salary for being seventeen years
out of law school ($16,528), as most salaries in legal
academia would reflect. There is some impact for having
taught for eleven years ($3,883); less of an impact, ($1,592)
for supervising a staff of four; and about $9,000 for teaching
at an average size law school. The predicted salary for a legal
writing director who has been out of law school seventeen
years, taught in law school for eleven years, and supervised
four people in a moderate size law school, is $67,000.31 That
is less than the SALT data identified for the median salary of
assistant professors.3 2
Chart 2
Regression Model Prediction for an "Average" Legal
Writing Director
For an "average" director, the model would predict a salary of
* $35,950 as the base
=
$35,950
*

Plus $972 x 17 years since

*

Law school graduation
Plus $353 x 11 years of teaching
experience

*

Plus $398 x 4 professional faculty

*

*

=

$16,524

=

$3,883

supervised
Plus $45 x 200 students in the

=

$ 1,592

entering class

=

$9,000

For a nontenure track job, this equals
Add $14,830 for a tenured or

tenured-track position
*

$66,949
=

$81,779

=

$92,288

Finally, add $10,509 if the director

is male

However,

the

typical

writing

director

is

someone

31. See d. at 571.
32. See 1997-99 SALT Salary Survey, SALT EQUALIZER, Mar. 1999, at 1.
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seventeen years out of law school, with eleven years of
teaching, a profile that is more similar to that of a full
professor. Add to that $67,000 salary an additional amount
if the position is a tenure-track position;33 now the salary is
almost $82,000. Then add another $10,509 bonus if the
director just happens to be male. There is a $10,509 annual
difference in salary merely for being male.3 4 This results in a
$92,288 predicted salary, much better than the $67,000
starting point for a nontenure-track female director.
As frustrating as these salary differences are for women
writing directors, the situation is much worse for legal writing
teachers as a group in the legal academy. Legal writing
teachers who are not directors, regardless of their gender,
earn about 10 percent less if they happen to work for a
female legal writing director. Through no fault of their own,
their salaries are about 10 percent lower if they just happen
to be a in a program headed by a female writing director. I
apologize often to my staff about that. In addition, the
writing teachers' salary situation is much worse because legal
writing teachers earn only about $40,000 a year." These
writing teachers are experienced attorneys, who in general
have had several years of teaching experience. Imagine how
frustrating that low salary is given the discussion recently
about six-figure starting salaries for new law graduates
without any experience whatsoever.

33.
34.
35.
36.

See Durako, supra note 1, at 571.
See id.
See id. at 573.
See id.
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A study by Jan Levine and Kathy Stanchi, called,
"Women, Work and Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo,"3 7 found
that there were no significant differences between men and
women legal writing teachers' salaries. Given that the average
salary is as low as $40,000, fortunately there's not a $10,000
difference as there is for directors. Levine and Stanchi also
found, however, that there's no benefit for years out of law
school, unlike other areas of law teaching. This failure to
reward practice experience is especially ironic given that legal
writing is a skills course." They also found a very moderate
impact for teaching experience and very little benefit for
seniority. Legal writing salaries tend to go up only by 3 or 4
percent a year, on a base of $40,000,3 which keeps salaries
shockingly low.
If these are some of the employment conditions in the
legal academy for legal writing professionals, what are some
of the consequences of maintaining this kind of pink ghetto?
What is the impact of this structure on the legal academy?
Law schools are failing to achieve gender parity in their
faculties. Law schools are failing to properly acculturate law
students in the legal community. Law schools are sending
inappropriate messages about the value of legal writing and
the people who teach that subject. Law schools are failing to
support teaching and scholarship in the legal writing field.
And, possibly, they are perpetuating gender stereotypes in
law training. It's also distressing that women who don't have
the protection of tenure have so little power when it comes to
crafting how their subject is taught. Finally, there is false
diversity. Law schools with a large proportion of women in
legal writing positions tend to have a smaller proportion of
women in tenure track positions. 40 Having women on the
faculty but in a pink ghetto, and sometimes treated as
second-class citizens, jeopardizes important institutional
objectives.
The final questions I would like to leave you with today
relate to what makes law schools change their employment
37. Jan M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women Writing & Wages: Breaking the
Last Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551 ( 2001).
38. Id. at 573-74.
39. Id. at 574. See ALWD Surveys, supranote 29.
40. See Durako, supra note 1, at 574.
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practices? I'm not sure, but I'm looking to this section to
help answer that question. What are effective catalysts to
instututional change? Do labor and employment laws have a
role?
What kind of evidence does it take to change
employment patterns and practices? How much evidence?
Who needs to hear the evidence and when is it time to stop
studying and gathering evidence and to start changing
practices? Finally, I close by asking what do the statistics
say? What can we learn from the numbers? And how many
numbers does it take to change a law school? Thank you
very much.
TENURE: THE SHADOW WORK OF SERVICE
Professor Devon Wayne Carbado*: Good morning. The
purpose of this panel is to engage in a critical look at the
Ivory Tower. Needless to say, there are numerous places
within the Ivory Tower where one might look, and there is a
multiplicity of issues about which one might be critical. My
brief comments will "look" at advancement. The "critical"
posture I take with respect to advancement is to assume that
the Ivory Tower is neither structured by, nor organized
around, overt racial animosity. This environment, I will
suggest, is not a race-free environment. Race remains at work
by, among other processes, the operation of stereotypes. The
basic argument I advance, which draws on work that I have
been doing with my colleague Mitu Gulati," is this:
stereotypes about non-white identity will often be at odds
with the norms upon which most faculty cultures are based.
The tension between identity stereotypes, on one hand, and
faculty norms, on the other, creates difficulties for non-white
faculty members with respect to each criterion for tenure;
that is, teaching, service, and scholarship.
In the interest of time, I will focus my comments on
* Professor of Law and Director of the Critical Race Studies Concentration,
University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.
41. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79
OR. L. REv. 103 (2001), Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Ffth Black Woman, 2
J. CONTEMP. L. PROB. 709 (2001), Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at
Work: Remembering David A. Charney, 17 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J.13 (2001); Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259 (2000).
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service. To the extent the tenure review process has been
examined, much of the attention focuses on scholarship and
teaching. Service remains under-theorized. My hope is that
my rather limited comments will invite further conversations
about the relationship among race, service, and tenure. I
have titled my comments "Tenure: The Shadow Work of
Service." First, I will articulate a theory as to the role service
plays, both formally and informally, in the tenure review
process. Then, I will discuss how race is implicated in this
role to reveal, if you like, the weight of race on service.
Although the discussion is situated squarely within the
context of law faculty cultures, the general claim I advance is
applicable to other departments within the Ivory Tower as
well.
At most institutions, service is the least significant
criterion for tenure. That is to say, as a formal matter,
service does not weigh as heavily as teaching and scholarship
on the tenure determination scale. Presumably, none of you
is surprised by this statement. However, the institutional
governance difficulties this hierarchical ordering of criteria
For a faculty to function,
creates are often overlooked.
faculty members need to perform service work, but because
service is only marginally important to advancement, there is
little incentive for faculty members to perform this work. This
is a very real, and a systemic, problem. Ask any dean. To
ameliorate this problem, institutions create incentives for
faculty members to engage in service work via at least the
following two mechanisms (1) the establishment of what I will
call "the norm of the good citizen," and (2) the maintenance of
vague tenure standards with wide discretion reserved to
senior faculty. I will discuss each of these incentive
mechanisms in turn.
By the norm of good citizenship I mean a message the
institution sends, both explicitly and implicitly, that it
expects faculty members to be collegial, loyal, institutionally
engaged, community builders. Presumably, all of you have
received this message, presumably, some of you more directly
than others. Significantly, the establishment of the norm of
good citizenship does not, without more, create a meaningful
incentive for faculty members to perform service work. Even
with this norm, the fact remains that, as a formal matter,
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service is only marginally important to advancement.
Moreover, it will be a rare instance, indeed, where
information about service reaches, or is considered important
to, the external labor market. The incentive that the norm of
good citizenship creates for faculty members to perform
service work derives primarily from the role service plays in
setting the stage for the tenure review process. Specifically, a
faculty member's status as a good or bad good citizen (a)
functions as a prism through which teaching and scholarship
are evaluated and (b) influences the bottom line vote on
tenure. To put this another way, a faculty is more likely to
view a person's scholarship or teaching favorably to the
extent that person is perceived to be a good citizen. Further, a
faculty is more likely to vote yes on the question of whether a
junior faculty member should be promoted to tenure to the
extent that person is perceived to be a good citizen.
In part, both of these outcomes are possibly because of
vague tenure standards. Every junior faculty member likely
understands that the criteria for tenure are scholarship,
teaching, and service. Every junior faculty member also likely
understands that, in a tenure decision, scholarship will weigh
more heavily than teaching and teaching more heavily than
service. Junior faculty often will not, however, know whether
good service can make up for bad teaching and, if so, to what
extent. Compounding this problem is discretion - more
particularly, the junior faculty's awareness that senior
colleagues will employ different formulas for negotiating
among scholarship, teaching, and service, and that, even for
any given senior faculty member, the tenure formula is not
stable; that is, it shifts from case to case. The dual problem
of ambiguity and discretion creates an institutional space
within which one's status as a good or bad citizen can matter,
and not simply as an important criterion for tenure, but more
broadly as a template from which the actual tenure case is
constructed.
All of this is to say that the Ivory Tower maintains what
one might think of as a "low powered" evaluative
environment, an environment within which subjectivity
abounds. Within these environments, there is a considerable
amount of discussion about norms, and about their
importance to the institution and to advancement;
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paradoxically, however, there is very little discussion about
precisely how the institution will enforce or operationalize
these norms. Low powered environments alter the incentives
for employees to perform service work even when, as a formal
matter, service as a criterion for tenure remains marginally
important to promotion. This is so because service work is
linked to the norm of good citizenship, and because good
citizenship is linked to scholarship and teaching, and to the
tenure vote, via the problems of ambiguity and discretion.
The question now becomes: How is race implicated in this
story? Asked another way, how does race compound the
incentive to be a good citizen? Let me turn directly to this
question and answer it in four interrelated ways. First, I will
explain the racial incentive people of color have to perform
service work. Second, I will discuss the pressure on people
color to say "yes" when their institutions request that they
perform service work. Third, I will focus on the nexus
between the "racial quality" of the service work a person of
color performs and the perceived racial identity of that person
- whether, for example, a person is determined to be
stereotypically or non-stereotypically black based on how she
performs service work. And fourth, I will describe faculty
cultures as "squeaky wheel" systems - systems within which
requests for at least some institutional resources need to be
made.
First, the racial incentive for people of color to perform
service work. Where does this incentive come from? The
incentive derives from the relationship between the norms of
the Ivory Tower, on the one hand, and negative racial
stereotypes (or at least assumptions about racial identity), on
the other. Consider what this relationship might look like
with Latina/o identity in mind. The institution will value
racial neutrality; the faculty might perceive the Latina/o
faculty member to be racially conscious. The institution will
want collegial community builders; the faculty might assume
that the Latina/o faculty member is a complainer and/or that
s/he is likely to be combative. The institution will want
people who are status quo oriented; the perception might be
that the Latina/o faculty member will be anti-institutional.
The institution will want people to fit in; the faculty might
assume either that the Latina/o faculty member will not want
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to fit in or that s/he lacks the capacity to do so.
Cumulatively, these institutional norm/racial stereotype
pairings create an incentive for non-white faculty members to
take on service work. This work allows non-white faculty to
become what they are presumed not to be - good citizens.
More broadly, non-white faculty can use service work to
disconfirm a variety of negative racial stereotypes and to
integrate themselves into predominantly white faculties. In
this sense, service work is also a form of what I call "shadow
racial labor" - race-based work institutions expect people of
color to perform but that institutions do not acknowledge
formally as work. This is not to say that there is no pay-off or
"compensation" for this work. Indeed, to the extent that a
person of color performs service work in a manner that
disconfirms negative racial stereotypes, she increases the
likelihood that she will be tenured. The point is that the
shadow racial labor of service is part of the Ivory Tower's
underground economy. Formally, this work would be
considered illegal under Title VII, which prohibits institutions
from making employment decisions based on racial
stereotypes. And normatively, many people would find this
racialized form of labor problematic.
Yet the underground economy for shadow racial labor
continues to thrive, in part because this work helps to
sustain, and, indirectly, to give anti-discrimination legitimacy
to, the Ivory Tower. Keep in mind that it is people of color
who are performing shadow racial labor. With little or no
difficulty, faculties can highlight the racial presence of nonwhite faculty members to convey the idea that the faculty is
non-discriminatory and obscure the racially discriminatory
labor non-white faculty members are expected to perform as
part of their institutional service. In this sense, the fact that
there is an incentive for people of color to perform service,
and that the performance of service will include shadow racial
labor, does not necessarily create an institutional legitimacy
problem for the Ivory Tower.
Quite apart from the incentive for non-white faculty
members to take on service work, there is the pressure for
them to say "yes" when their institution requests that they
perform this work. This is particularly significant given that
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institutions typically do not make generalized requests for
For example, it is
faculty members to do service work.
unlikely that a dean or an associate dean would distribute a
faculty-wide e-mail with something like the following
message, "We're being reviewed by the ABA this year and
need to constitute a committee. I need as many volunteers as
possible." As a general matter, this is not the way
institutional decision-makers seek out employees to perform
service work, and for good reason. Few, if any of us, would
For one thing, working on this
respond to that e-mail.
committee is just not going to be fun. For another, service on
this committee likely will not produce big payoffs in terms of
advancement. Finally, the opportunity costs of performing
this work likely will include time taken away from scholarship
and teaching. To the extent that the institution wants people
to work on the ABA committee, it is far more likely to employ
the "personal touch." In the middle of the afternoon, the
dean or associate dean, will stop by a faculty member's office
and say something like, "We're constituting a committee to
review our institution. We really need your help. We have an
important opportunity to think hard about where we have
been and where we should be. Your voice could help us chart
that trajectory." With the personal touch, the costs of saying
"no" increase, particularly for non-white employees. For them,
the issue is not simply whether it is sensible to say no to the
dean or associate dean. Non-white employees may also be
concerned about whether declining the request will confirm
preexisting negative stereotypes or racial assumptions, for
example, about race consciousness, non-collegiality, antiinstitution orientation, or self-interestedness. So, in addition
to the pressure created by the desire to avoid declining the
request, non-white faculty members also face pressure
created by the desire to disconfirm negative stereotypes.
Thus far I have discussed, albeit rather briefly, how race
might compound both the incentive to seek out service work
and the incentive to say "yes" when the institution requests
that one perform such work. Let me now turn to the third
problem that strengthens the incentive people of color have to
engage in service work. This problem derives from the
following claim. The extent to which the perception of good
citizenship influences (a) the prism through which
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scholarship and teaching are evaluated and (b) the bottom
line vote on tenure is a function not just of whether one is
performing service work but also of what I am calling the
"racial quality" of the service work. By the racial quality of
service work I mean whether the person of color's
performance of such work confirms or disconfirms negative
stereotypes. Consider this question with respect to service
work on the hiring committee. How this committee evaluates
a candidate will likely reflect ideological commitments about,
among other things, merit, diversity, elitism, and curricula. A
person of color's expressed views while participating on the
hiring committee are likely to be constrained by concerns that
contesting merit could signal an interest in unqualified
hiring, promoting diversity could signal an interest in identity
politics, and challenging elitism could signal an interest in
anti-institutional politics. In effect, such a person is
bargaining in the shadow of racial stereotypes. In this sense,
her burden here is not simply that she has to perform service
work, but also that she has to negotiate that performance so
as to avoid confirming negative racial stereotypes.
The fourth and final problem that serves to increase the
incentives for people of color to perform service work relates
to what Mitu Gulati and I call the "squeaky wheel" system.
One feature of law faculties is that institutional resources
such as research funding, funding for conferences,
technology, and administrative help must be requested.
Typically, there will be a base line level of support, but
anything above that level is provided on a demand, that is to
say a "who asks," basis. The faculty only has a limited
number of extra resources; if everyone asked there would not
be enough to go around. The system "works," among reasons,
for the following two: not everyone squeaks the wheel, and
faculties are low information environments; generally,
individual faculty members will know neither who is
squeaking nor who is getting oil. Within these environments,
there will be a number of people who do not ask because they
do not have resource wants or needs. More importantly,
many people who do not ask may be deterred by the social
cost of asking, being perceived as selfish, self interested, or
greedy; in short, being perceived as a bad citizen. Race
compounds one's vulnerability to being perceived in this way.
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To the extent that there is a positive relationship between
one's race and the perception that one is a bad citizen, one's
ability to squeak the wheel for resources is constrained.
Needless to say, this discussion has been decidedly
cursory. Still, my hope is that what I have said will begin a
conversation about race, service work, and tenure. I have
argued that the tension between norms and racial stereotypes
creates an even greater incentive for people of color to
perform service work than the incentive for whites to perform
service work. I have argued as well that this tension
structures how people of color to perform this work.
Surprisingly, the antidiscrimination literature on race and
tenure has not captured, let alone engaged, these racial
dynamics. My own view is that understanding the
relationship among race, service work, and tenure can help to
identity and to ameliorate the informal racial terms upon
which people of color become tenured members of the Ivory
Tower. More broadly, unpacking this relationship may
provide at least a partial explanation for why, in the absence
of overt racial discrimination, access to tenure remains
racialized.
Professor Margaret E. Montoya*: Good morning. Let me
begin by thanking Lisa for organizing this conversation and
focusing us on the academy as a workplace. Let me begin by
positioning myself as a law professor, with some ten years in
the academy, but before that as associate university counsel
for employment practices at the University of New Mexico. I
was, for some period of time, in charge of dversity issues,
including faculty hiring policies at the university, and before
that I was at SUNY Potsdam, as Assistant to the President in
charge of affirmative action.
While I was at the University of New Mexico, the
university underwent a comprehensive review by the
Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs, and my role in that investigation was to put
together what we might call a Sears Defense. We were out of
compliance. We didn't have an affirmative action plan to
speak of; there was a document, but it was not in
compliance. There was a class action that had been filed by
*
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African-Americans, and a class action that had been filed by
Hispanics. There were numerous individual claims that had
been made on the basis of disability, and a couple of age
claims.
So, there was a very comprehensive set of claims and my
job, really, was to look at policies and practices and try to
bring us into more than compliance. If we could show that
we were quite aggressive about such things as affirmative
action we would have a better chance if we actually faced
litigation.
So, some of the observations that I'm going to make today
come out of that experience, both being a faculty member and
being university counsel. And my comments today are
intended to be quite specific in terms of some of the problems
and then some specific suggestions. My comments are made
in light of the different roles many of us have with respect to
employment practices. Some of us may be going through
searches at this time; we may be facing tenure or promotion
reviews; some of us chair or participate as members of search
committees, promotion and tenure committees, or ad hoc
committees that are asked to write the policies that govern
employment practices in our law schools. Others of us may
have oversight responsibilities as deans or associate deans,
and still others of us may be engaged in recruiting and
advising persons who are contemplating academic careers.
I would hazard a guess that most of us, our colleagues
included, have never been trained to engage in these
activities. We have no formal training as to how to conduct
effective searches, write job descriptions or job ads, interview
candidates, or evaluate our colleagues, and these activities
that we engage in have life altering consequences for people
and for the collective well being of our faculty.
I'm going to make four points. First, searches are an
enactment of faculty values and of the law school culture.
Second, the tenure evaluation begins with the search process
and the job offer letter should carefully delineate important
aspects of the tenure rules. Third, untenured faculty should
begin compiling their dossiers as soon as they are hired.
Fourth, each year faculty members whatever their status,
tenured, untenured, clinicians whether on or off the track,
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should develop written objectives for their teaching, their
scholarship and their service agendas and provide
evaluations with an analysis of how they have met their
goals.
Let me say a few words about each of those and then
offer some proposals. Searches are an instantiation of our
values and the law school culture. Many law schools, as we
have heard from the previous speakers, profess commitments
to such values as transparency, diversity, and collegiality,
and yet act both collectively and individually in ways that
subvert those commitments. Each search implicates where
the law school is headed in its overall mission and, therefore,
it becomes an opportunity to advance or to impede different
ideological agendas. The candidates are often in the dark
about these undercurrents; there are often coalitions of
faculty that form to control the dynamics and outcome of
searches. Inexperienced, naIve or gullible faculty are often
unaware of the machinations involving the composition of
search committees, unauthorized communications that go on
with certain candidates, with references for certain
candidates, or with hiring officials such as those on main
campus. There is uneven application of the written rules, and
this is what Lisa talked about as micropolitics. Those of us
who are concerned with diversity, academic freedom,
affirmative action, and social justice must become more
astute about these procedures. I think that we should find a
vehicle, perhaps the AALS Committee on Minority
Recruitment and Retention, maybe SALT, to begin collecting,
analyzing and reporting on employment practices and
employment irregularities.
Right now we have no idea
whether there are trends or patterns or even emerging good
practices. Such a report would help us have an
understanding of what the status of these processes are.
Second, the tenure process begins with a search and with
a job offer letter that should highlight key aspects of the
If we are
process for the prospective faculty member.
concerned about fair and equitable procedures, we should
ensure that at least the finalists have access to the faculty
handbook or the other rules, both formal and informal, that
are going to govern the process by which they become
permanent members of the faculty. The reason is that
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women, people of color, and other outsiders don't have
informants who can let them know what they should be
asking. Candidates, for example, often don't realize that they
can negotiate a range of things: salary, of course, but
frequently other things that are valued within that workplace
are open to negotiation, such as location of the office, office
furnishings, whether they will have RA's or TA's, what the
work load is going to be, the length of the tenure period. It is
the people who have the weakest bargaining power, as in any
workplace, that don't know that these may be negotiated.
So, what do I suggest? I think that we could either
collectively, or at least within our individual schools, prepare
a candidates' handbook that would contain a general
description of procedures, from the interview all the way to
post-tenure reviews. I understand that policies and practices
vary, but even a comparison of the differences between
policies at different law schools would be highly useful. A part
of that handbook would be a sample job offer letter because
the following data should be given to people upon being hired.
A letter should show what the job title is, plus rank and
salary.
The letter should include any negotiated terms,
conditions or perquisites, the date the job begins, what the
teaching workload is going to be, and what the expectations
are with respect to scholarship. In many law schools these
are highly formalized. The letter should describe the types of
journals in which publication is expected, the number of
publications that are expected, service assignments, how
many committees the person will have to work on, copies of
the formal regulations, the faculty handbook, the employee
manual, if one exists, law school policies, if those exist,
together with the chronology of when the actual reviews will
take place that lead to the final tenure decision. It seems
almost commonplace to suggest that the offer letter should
contain this information, but I think that you will find, as I
have found both at my school and in consulting at other
places, that most people do not receive this information in
writing.
Third, untenured faculty should begin assembling their
dossiers as soon as they are hired. I think that we would find
that many faculty scramble in those last weeks before their
review to put together their materials. It would behoove both
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the candidates and the institution to develop orderly
Each faculty member
mechanisms for these evaluations.
should receive a notebook upon being hired with three
sections, for scholarship, teaching and service, and each
section should be further subdivided.
The scholarship
section would begin with the person's statement on
scholarship goals. It would include articles in print, those in
progress, and those that are planned, presentations at
meetings and colloquia, and, if they are clinicians or if they
work in positions that allow other kinds of academic work,
briefs or other court documents. Finally, it should end with a
self-evaluation.
The teaching section would have a statement on teaching
philosophy, pedagogy and goals, and would include syllabi,
course materials, pedagogical innovations, student evaluations and, finally, a self-evaluation. The service section, both
internal and external, may seem obvious, but it's obvious to
many of us only after we have gone through the process. I
would suggest that it isn't that obvious to people who are
entering, especially if they haven't had the experience of
putting together these materials. This notebook could then
be incorporated into conversations with a faculty member as
a way of encouraging its implementation and its use.
Let me say a few more words about this notion of a selfevaluation. As we have heard from Devon, faculty members
who are engaged in new genre of scholarship or
experimenting with novel teaching techniques frequently have
to consider how they are going to be viewed by colleagues
who are more traditional. Therefore, they are going to be in a
position of having to interpret their work for their colleagues,
explaining the purpose of the work, where it fits in terms of
jurisprudence, what criteria the faculty should be using to
evaluate the work, and how it is that the faculty member
considers their own work successful. This document is
useful when it's done at two different times: first,
prospectively, where the person articulates what their goals
are going to be, and second, retrospectively, when the person
then talks about how he or she has met the objectives.
We at the University of New Mexico now make this a
university-wide requirement. Whether tenured or untenured,

156

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:129

we are required each year to articulate our teaching and our
scholarship goals and then, at the end of the academic year,
a self-evaluation.
Let me say a final word about student labor and I'm just
going to take a moment. In the past several years I have been
having a conversation with my students about their written
work, giving them the option of doing work that is going to be
used by an entity outside of the law school, and some of my
students do materials that would be used by high school
teachers, for example. I do this because I think that much of
the work that is done by law students isn't given the proper
respect.
It is done for one reader, usually the faculty
evaluator, and the work is then shelved. It isn't distributed to
other students, it really isn't made available, and so a way of
saying to students that there is a way to add value to the
work that they produce is to make it available to a wider
audience and to put it to a different use. I think that others
of us should start thinking about whether there is a way of
mobilizing the work of our students in order to address issues
of social justice. That is, are there unmet needs outside of the
law school that could be addressed using work that could
also be evaluated for grades? Thank you.
FACULTY ISSUES IN THREE ACTS
Professor Michael A. Olivas*: I draw today from several
different experience bases. First, I have taught the Higher
Education Law class for twenty years, and have written a
casebook available in fine bookstores everywhere.4 2 Because
of this, I have been lucky enough to get people to send me
wonderful, weird, and often unprintable cases and filings,
unprintable because of what I will talk about in a moment,
vulgarity in the classroom. Often I can't put these into the
book. So, those are some of the pleadings that I get. My
favorite piece in that book is the story about a case that was
litigated at the University of Michigan that appeared in Rolling
Stone, that authoritative law resource, that dozens of
* William B. Bates Distinguished Chair, University of Houston Law Center.
42. MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COLLEGES IN COURT (1997).
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students every year call and tell me they really love. 43 In
addition, I spent four years as general counsel of the AAUP,
and so a lot of these materials make their way from my AAUP
experience. This is in the spirit of full disclosure.
I also studied to be a Catholic priest for eight years and
so things fall into threes for me. So I'd like to share three
different things. I'm going to talk about three cases involving
law teachers, cases that law teachers lost, and my overall
thesis is that notwithstanding the protections of academic
freedom and notwithstanding the perdition of post-tenure
review, we are our own worst enemies, as I think these three
cases will suggest. These are first, about grades and grading
disputes, second, vulgar language and classroom manner,
the general coarsening of classroom discourse, and finally,
sexual harassment, and in each of these three areas I have
literally dozens of cases I could have chosen for the same
issue. Some of these people really think I make these up, but
I have federal or state cites for each of them.
In the first case, grading and grading disputes, I always
tell my students in the beginning of class that there's never
been a case where a grade was overturned by a judge and so
they'd better make their peace with the way that I grade. I
say it a lot nicer than that, but that's really the ultimate
message to dissuade them from going to my dean to complain
about me, in which case, I tell them it's because I expect so
much from them that the grades are so low. However, there
has finally been a case where a grade was actually overturned
by a federal judge, Sylvester v. Texas Southern University Law
School,44 and this case, which reads like a fact pattern that we
drew up at midnight, is about a teacher who gave a student a
"D." She was about to be the salutatorian, the second ranked
in her class, not the valedictorian, which meant that she
wasn't used to getting D's. In fact, she never received
anything lower than a B, but she got the D in a Wills and
Trusts class.4 5 TSU has a student-faculty grade appeal
committee, or at least it did at the time, and she submitted
this issue to the committee, but the teacher couldn't produce
43. T. Senger, Trial By Fire, in id. at 791.
44. 957 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
45. Id. at 945.
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the exam, so the committee had nothing to act upon and
refused to act. By then, she was about to graduate.4 6 So she
took them to federal court and the court actually took it. The
professor didn't show as required during the trial. The judge
sent out the marshals and couldn't find him, so he found him
in contempt. They sent out the marshals again and finally
hauled him in, and the judge made the teacher pay the
student's airfare and costs because he hadn't appeared in
court as ordered. He conceded that he'd been served properly
and it turned out that he did find the exam, eventually, but
insisted and said that it was a "D." TSU bailed out and said,
well, because there are students on this committee there's a
conflict of interest - they will know the other student and,
therefore, can't review him.4 7 Of course, they could have put
third year students or someone else on the committee but, in
any event, they chose not to act and so commencement came
and she graduated third instead of what she had thought
would be first in her class.4 8
Finally, when all the dust cleared, the judge excoriated
the school, saying if you have a committee you have to use it,
and if you've got due process you have to use it.49 The
student waited two years to get a final exam graded. The
teacher put no marks on the exam at all, and didn't have an
answer sheet. In fact, he said that the correct answer was
"yes," as part of the trial transcript. So the judge, fed up with
all of this, threw up his hands and said I order you to enter a
pass and that she be reinstated as co-valedictorian. And so,
TSU wisely chose not to appeal the case, so it never made its
way to the Fifth Circuit. It simply is Southern District of
Texas law right now. But during all those years, every single
grade challenge had been turned back unless there had been
something like a quid pro quo: you perform a sexual act, I will
give you an "A." There's actually a case like that in a
southern state. It wasn't a law school; I think it was a school
of communications.s0 I didn't include it because it wasn't a
46. Id. at 945-46.
47. Id. at 946.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 947.
50. Naragon v. Wharton, 737 F. 2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984), affg, 572 F. Supp. 1117
(M.D.La. 1983).
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law school case, but there are literally dozens of cases on the
issue of students grieving grades and only one, to my
knowledge and my review of these, where the grade has
actually been overturned."
In the second area, vulgar language and classroom
manner, there are reams of cases. I couldn't find a law
school vulgar language case, perhaps because our bar is set
so low that virtually anything can go, but I did think you
52
would have interest in Gee v. Florida Board Regents,
involving a communications professor. This arose at Florida
A. & M. University, an historically black institution and he
was a white professor, and some student asked "Are we going
be able to find work after we graduate?" and he said 'Yes, as
long as you don't act like niggers." Well, he was fired for
this. The case is a complicated one because it turns out he
thought he was being hip because, as you could imagine, he'd
heard his students use the term, but at the end of the day he
ended up losing at the Florida Court of Appeals. That's a very
complicated case because I believe that faculty ought to be
able to speak more frankly in class; I don't think that that's
an encouraging word and I haven't finished Randy Kennedy's
book yet so I'm not quite sure of all the additional details, but
at the end of the day he ended up losing the case.
For sexual harassment cases I have to turn to a case of a
University of Idaho law professor who, after he had an affair
with a student that had gone bad, wrote a letter to every
lawyer in the state of Idaho and the State Bar saying that she
was a slut. 5 He, of course, lost this case although he claimed
he was protected by academic freedom.
Now, I've gotten to the point where I can pick up a case
and smell it and tell you whether or not it's an academic
freedom case that's going to win, and there are certainly
cases in the other direction in each of these three areas,
grades, vulgar language classroom manner, and sexual
3

51. See, e.g., Disesa v. St. Louis Community College, 79 F.3d 92 (8th Cir. 1996);
Clements v. Nassau County Community College, 835 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1987);
Ikpeazu v. University of Neb., 775 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1985); McAlpin v. Burnett, 185
F. Supp. 2d 730 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
52. This is an unpublished opinion, The result is reported at 718 So. 2d 175
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1998).
53. George v. University of Idaho, 822 P. 2d 549 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
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harassment, in which faculty won, even those who had really
dreadful cases.
Professor Silva for example, who was a
writing teacher, though not a legal writing teacher, likened
writing to the sexual act. To illustrate good technical writing,
he used Little Egypt's definition of belly dancing as "like JellO on a plate with a vibrator." Literally, those were his
metaphors. He said later he meant the kind of vibrator that
you use when you're getting a massage, like barbers used to
use. Maybe this is a male metaphor or something, but they
dismissed him without a proper hearing and so the AAUP
entered on his side and he ended up winning the case. These
cases pose very difficult questions.
A case arose in a community college, where an awful lot
of these cases are arising by the way because of norms at
community colleges where you don't have faculty who have
doctorates and sometimes it's people who are not fully
engaged as teachers, or the norms are not quite what they
are at more collegiate institutions, who used pornography to
try to get his students interested in reading. 5 I suppose to
get students reading you ought to take the extra step, but do
we really need to do this kind of thing? I think that these are
all self-inflicted wounds. These are not people who, in my
view, are Mr. Chips. (I've never had a chance to defend Mr.
Chips in court.)
So, what do I draw from this? A recent study showed
that at public colleges, legal claims increased almost five-fold
since 1992, while the total number of institutions
experiencing claims more than tripled since then.5 6 Do you
wonder why there's such a course as Higher Education Law?
It's because there's a lot of work out there for my students.
Now if these events continue as in the past, there can really
be no doubt that higher education will be increasingly
legalized by the traditional means of legislation, regulation,
and litigation, as well as by a growing area of informal
lawmaking, an area that I'm looking into now - ballot
initiatives, insurance carrier policies, commercial or contract
54

54. Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293, 299 (D.N.H. 1994).
55. Cohen v. San. Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'ing,
883 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
56. Emphasis Upon Under-Managed Risk (brochure published by TillinghastTowers Perrin, 1998) (on file with author).
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law.
This cascade will shower down upon institutions,
leaving its residue in the form of increased administrative
responsibility for acknowledging and implementing the
reforms.
The considerable autonomy and deference accorded
higher education often translates into institutions designing
their own compliance regimes, for legislative and litigative
change. An increased understanding of this complex legal
phenomenon should increase this independence. Higher
education officials could begin to convince legislatures that
mandated legal change has a better chance of achieving the
desired effects if institutions are allowed to design their own
compliance and implementation strategies. This, of course,
has the downside that they can weasel out, as has been the
case in some of the several post-tenure reviews, where it's an
extremely light touch. Now, I'm not against that. I think that
evidence that there's no god is post-tenure review, but this
rule could ease the sting that so many campuses feel when
yet another regulatory program is thrust upon them or when
they lose an important case, such as the University of Texas
when they lost the Hopwood case, 5 and had to revise their
procedures generally.
Evidence that there is a god, I
suppose, is they had to change. It could lead higher
education officials to seek reasonable compliance rather than
exemption, which often occurs in practice.
This very brief review shows how interdependent the
higher education system is and reveals why we need to adapt
to the times. Our timeless values, such as academic freedom,
tenure, institutional autonomy, and due process, are in
danger of being legislated or litigated away if we don't remain
vigilant and alert and if we do not self-police. For there are
many police outside the academy all too willing to do so if we
do not.
Dean Rex R. Perschbacher: My thanks to Lisa Iglesias
and to the Sections on Labor Relations and Employment Law
and Minority Groups for sponsoring and organizing this
panel.
Those who have gone before me have done an
excellent job raising several challenging issues regarding the
57. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law.
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Ivory Tower as a workplace. In responding to the issues
before this panel - (1) the extent to which practices in the
academy comply with basic requirements of American labor
and employment laws; (2) the extent to which these laws
effectively address discriminatory practices; and (3) the kinds
of reform efforts needed to promote equal opportunity and
academic freedom - I want to make five points that, once you
hear them, you will realize you already know. The five points
are:
1. Law school is more about school (the university) than
law.
2. Leadership matters more than law (but you can
legislate morality).
3. Choose opportunities over ideology.
4. Symbols matter; and
5. "Reality bites" or economics is all that probably matters
in the end (know your limitations).
Law school is more about school (the university) than law.
When it comes to workplace issues within our law schools, we
are truly part of the greater world of the academy (the
university). We act mostly like other academics, with very
little attention to our arguably special circumstances as
scholars, students, and teachers of law. Thus we should not
expect law schools to be notably attentive to obedience to
labor laws and regulations or even specially attentive to the
issues of equal protection and due process.
Particularly
among the faculty you find attention to these matters (due
process is an especially noteworthy example) confined to the
classroom, and their conduct when personally involved in
issues with colleagues and students that of a university
faculty member generally. We share the outlook, hierarchy,
and cultural attitudes of higher education more than a first
allegiance to law. In this way we should be careful to avoid
the myopia of a legal profession that professed its devotion to
the civil rights laws, but argued that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to the decision to promote
associates to partner."
Leadership matters more than law (but you can legislate
morality). How can we improve our attention to the law, to
58. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
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promoting true equality among the teaching faculty and
within students and staff, and how can we promote better
relations among these groups? My answer is that rules
matter less than leadership at the highest levels. Efforts to
diversify the faculty, students, and staff are likely to succeed
based much more on whether there is risk-taking leadership
from faculty leaders, deans, provosts, chancellors, presidents,
and other leaders in higher education, than by having the
very best laws, regulations, standards, etc. As previous
panelists have noted, mandated legal norms are relatively
few, and those that exist are malleable; whereas there is
enormous discretion and room for interpretation within
existing laws. Moreover, as my colleague and chair of the
Section on Minority Groups, Kevin Johnson, pointed out to
me on the way here, no battle for justice is ever "won";
success is not static or permanent. You can never rest in
seeking equality and diversity within our law schools. The
moment you stop paying attention, there will be backsliding.
Leadership remains a constant need.
As a counterpoint, as I learned in law school, you can
legislate morality; Congress does it all the time. Civil rights
laws do matter, as do labor laws which can force changes in
how we do the business of higher education as well as
promote better economic, legal, and status equality in the
academy (and in the society at large). As Michael Olivas just
noted, certain particularly egregious differences in pay among
instructors can be a direct violation of the Equal Pay Act. 59
Still, some laws can hurt. The otherwise progressive
Americans With Disabilities Acteo has been used by relatively
privileged law school applicants to gain additional advantages
in admissions, to the disadvantage of economically less-welloff applicants many of whom are members of under
represented racial and ethnic groups.
Choose opportunities over ideology. In this way, I am for
"joining the club" over seeking to attack it from the outside.
As a teacher of Professional Responsibility, I like to
emphasize what Professor Hazard once referred to as "ethical

59. Pub.L. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
60. Pub.L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
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61

opportunities" in practice.
Instead of insisting on a single
"better" approach to our ethical responsibilities, we are rather
shaped by the opportunities presented in our journey
through practice and whether we make good use of them or
not. This Aristotelian approach applies to labor and
employment in the academy as well. Rather than the perfect
non-discrimination or affirmative action plan, progress is
likely to come from taking advantage of opportunities to
promote equality; to hire women or people of color; to
promote a particular clinical or legal writing instructor. In
this effort, it is important to remember that each law school's
situation is different.
We should pay attention to the
opportunities presented at a particular law school at a
particular time and place, and not expect each school to
make identical progress. This system is imperfect, but it
avoids making perfection the enemy of any progress.
Opportunities are particularly rich in the university for
making progress in eliminating the barriers of race, sex,
ethnic background, sexual orientation and the rest because
the liberal ethos of the university accepts equality and
diversity as goods and cares about them as a matter of
principle. Compare, for example, the relative difficulty of
promoting equal opportunity for all groups within the
university to the military or police or firefighters or
professional sports. In this case, the university is fertile
ground.
Symbols matter. Related to the second part of the second
point, things like tenure do matter. This was a major theme
of Jo Anne Durako's presentation. Whether it accomplishes
the goals it was purportedly created for - protection of
academic freedom - something about which I am extremely
skeptical, as, from a different point of view, is Michael Olivas,
it does matter, for it admits you to highest levels of the
mysterious world of the faculty. So it matters that clinical or
writing instructors have the vote and serve on committees;
that faculty appointments committees are led by women and
people of color; that deans are not just white males; that staff
are consulted and a part of academic plans; that students are
61. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr, Ethical Opportunity in the Practice of Law, 27
DIEGO L. REv. 127 (1990).
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on faculty committees. Having faculty and administrators of
diverse backgrounds will have a positive impact on the
success of students of color, as Doug Scherer will next
discuss. Even small things matter. At UC Davis we have a
It is easy to
statement of "Principles of Community."
dismiss them as mere rhetoric. But, when the campus was
looking for ways to explain the need for tolerance and mutual
respect among all members of our campus community in the
wake of the tragic events of September 11, we could point to
these Principles that called for "mutual respect and caring"
and "the right of every individual to think and speak" as an
They were treated as an expression of the
individual.
community values and given the force of law. We should
always be attentive to symbols, and to what counts as a
symbol, even when their impact may be less than hoped.
"Reality bites" or economics is all that probably matters in
the end (know your limitations). We are part of the world of
labor and employment at large. As a result, there are serious
limits to what can be accomplished by any one person or
group of persons at any time or place. If higher education is
hurting economically, that is not good news for those in out
groups, nor for the promotion of equality. Salaries are always
going to be the hardest test - harder to change, harder to
equalize. Hierarchical structures supported by elites are
tough to crack. As Jo Anne Durako mentioned, adding
tenured positions is slow and difficult. We need to look
around to see who runs the place and what it looks like.
Much, too much, of the academic world is still the preserve of
white, often middle-aged, males, and, to a lesser extent,
females. Change is going to take time. The impact of this
limitation, to me, means that progress will depend upon
small steps taken at opportune times, with humility; and that
this is the best course for the long term. Thank you.
Professor Douglas D. Scherer*: Good morning. I'm Doug
Scherer. Lisa, thank you for inviting me to be part of this
excellent panel. My assigned task is to focus on the
admission, academic support, and bar exam preparation of
62

62. UC Davis Principles of Community, available at <http://www.ucdavis.edu/
principles.html> (last visited June 23, 2002).
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
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students of color, and discuss the connection between their
opportunities for success and the opportunities for success of
law professors of color. There is an inescapable linkage
between the two groups and elimination of the racial and
cultural barriers faced by applicants and students of color is
connected to elimination of the racial and cultural barriers
that affect law professors of color.
My most enjoyable work during the last twenty-five years
has been academic support work with law students, white
students and students of color. During the early years, I
worked with students who came to me because they heard
that I was available to help students who were having
academic difficulties. For the last twelve years, my work has
been more structured. For twelve years, I've served as the
director of my law school's academic support program for
students of color, a race-based program that deals with the
unique race-based problems faced by students of color at a
predominantly white law school. I also serve as the director
of our general academic support program, one
that
addresses the needs of all students at the law school. These
two complementary programs rely extensively on the work of
student teaching assistants and enhance the quality of the
legal education received by all students. The programs also
respond to the individual needs of students who are having
academic difficulties.
Students taught me almost every important thing I know
about academic support and I still learn from student
participants and from the upper-division students who work
as teaching assistants. One of the most important things I
learned, and learned in the early years, is how different the
academic support needs of students of color are from the
academic support needs of white students. For the most
part, the forces that cause students of color to have academic
difficulties are different from the forces that cause academic
difficulties for white students.
In the early years, I worked primarily with students on
academic probation, or who were close to being on academic
probation. Although I used the same basic methods for
determining why each student was having problems, and
relied upon the same types of solutions for each student, the
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academic success rate for the students of color was
substantially higher than it was for the white students. Now,
why would that be? It became clear to me that members of
both groups, with very few exceptions, were fully capable of
achieving success in law school. It also became clear that
most of the students of color didn't know what they needed to
do to achieve success, even though they were highly
motivated to succeed. Most of the white students, on the
other hand, did know what they needed to do to achieve
success, but for some reason were not able or willing to do it.
Most of the students who were in trouble and who were
academically dismissed were those who lacked motivation,
and most of those students were white.
What is the lesson in this? There are certain basic things
a first year law student must do to achieve success.
However, students usually don't learn about these things in
the classroom. Instead, they learn about them from upperdivision students. This system works well for first year
students who are racially, culturally, and socially connected
to successful upper-division students, but does not work well
for most students of color. Most students of color eventually
do pick up the information they need to succeed, but they
pick it up later, often in the second or third year of law
school.
In our race-based academic support program, highly
successful upper-division students of color serve as teaching
assistants and mentors for first year students of color. They
provide these students with the same information and
guidance most white students receive simply by being white

at a predominately white law school. One key, therefore, to
the success of our first year students of color is for upperdivision students of color, serving as teaching assistants, to
give them the information they need to achieve success,
information that is not easily accessible to students of color
at most law schools. The other key is for the teaching
assistants to provide mentoring that gives first year students
of color confidence in their ability to succeed in law school,
and creates a positive environment for their self development
and academic success.
Most students of color do not excel at most American law
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schools, and we should consider the reasons accepted by
many, if not most, law professors and deans for this relatively
low level of performance. Stated bluntly, many, if not most,
law professors and deans believe that students of color have
These are
writing, reasoning, and motivation problems.
comforting notions because they lead to the conclusion that
students of color deserve the low grades they receive. In my
academic support work with students of color, however, the
students demonstrate writing skills equivalent to those of
white students and demonstrate excellent reasoning skills
once they, like the white students, know what type of
reasoning is used in law schools. Plus, the students of color
with whom I have worked generally have a higher level of
motivation to succeed than white students. They have a
clearer idea of why they are in law school and have gone
through more struggle to get there.
What lies beneath the negative notions as to why
students of color do poorly in law school? In my view, what
lies beneath is a false and pernicious belief in the limited
academic ability of most applicants and students of color.
This belief causes people not to see the artificial barriers that
stand in the path of applicants and students of color, and
causes some law school deans and professors to erroneously
conclude that the necessary remedy is improvement in the
academic qualifications of the students of color who attend
American law schools.
This conclusion is blind to the strength of today's law
students of color, and it is the false notion of the academic
deficiency of students of color that fuels the current debate
over affirmative action. Professors of color are inextricably
linked to students of color in the minds of many, if not most,
white students, and the false stereotypes that undermine
students of color also undermine professors of color. One
way this manifests itself is in student evaluations. To quote
Devon, this is one of the "subtle but significant ways in which
race systematically disadvantages people of color.""
What is the basis for the false and pernicious notion of
63. The quotation is from the oral presentation made by Professor Devon
Carbado in this AALS Section program. A copy of the audiotape is on file with the
author.
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the academic deficiency of law students of color. It obviously
is connected to racial and cultural beliefs that have been with
this nation since its founding. But why does it persist at the
level of law school, and apply to professors and students of
color who have the intellectual qualities needed to reach this
level of academic achievement? A principle reason is the
message sent to law school communities, and society at large,
by testing done by the Law School Admission Council
("LSAC"). What is the message of the persistent gap between
test scores of whites and persons of color, with gaps among
test-takers of color that correlate with their darkness of skin
and degree of cultural alienation from the dominant society?
On many occasions, I have conducted validity studies
that compared LSAT scores of students of color with their law
school grades, and I consistently have found random or
nearly random correlation, with two caveats. For the 19901993 entering classes at Touro Law Center, I found that there
was an LSAT range below which the chances for academic
success of students of color decreased. This, however, was a
range below the bottom score cut-off point of the great
majority of law schools.
Second, during the 1990-1993
period, the Law Center enrolled a few students of color whose
LSAT scores were dramatically higher than those of other
students of color, and there seemed to be a slightly higher
likelihood of success for these students.
But for the
approximately 80 percent of the students of color who were
not at the extreme ends in their LSAT scores, and who passed
through the normal admissions committee review process,
the data suggested that LSAT scores were virtually
meaningless as predictors of law school success.
My validity studies have focused only on students of color
attending Touro Law Center and evaluated the correlation
between their law school grades, on one hand, and their
LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages
("UGPAs"), on the other. My original purpose was to help
craft admissions policies that use LSAT scores and UGPAs in
a way that brings in fully qualified students of color, without
mistakenly rejecting fully qualified applicants of color.
64

64. The low LSAT score range to which I refer correlates with the lowest 12-15%
of LSAT scores of all test-takers.
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Let me illustrate what I have learned by discussing the
results of two studies, an early and a recent one. The results
of the early validity study, for students of color who entered
Touro Law Center in the fall of 1992, are discussed in more
detail in footnote 65. These students constituted the largest
of the first three groups of students of color who entered the
Law Center after we established our race-based academic
support program, in the summer of 1990. Also discussed in
footnote 65 are the results of a recent study, based upon two
semesters of law school, for students of color who entered the
Law Center in the fall of 2000. Both studies show random,
or nearly random, correlation between law school grades and
LSAT scores, and random, or nearly random, correlation
between law school grades and UGPAs.6 5
65. The two illustrative validity studies discussed in the text are for students of
color who entered Touro Law Center in the fall of 1992 and fall of 2000, respectively.
The studies evaluated correlations between law school grades, on one hand, and
LSAT scores and UGPAs, on the other, and did so in a way that would be
understandable to law professors serving on admissions committees. Rather than
using traditional statistical methodology to calculate coefficients of correlation, I
divided each group of law students into four quartiles based upon their law school
grades and then calculated the average LSAT scores and average UGPAs of students
in each of the four quartiles. If LSAT scores and UGPAs predict likely law school
performance by students of color, the average LSAT scores and average UGPAs
should go down as one moves from the top quartile in law school academic
performance to the bottom quartile. In fact, the data reveal a different pattern.
The early study relates to the 90 students of color who were admitted to the
Law Center in the fall of 1992, and who completed one semester of study. Of these,
16 had LSAT scores either so low or so high that their inclusion in the study would
skew the results. Therefore, data for these 16 were not included in the study. The
remaining 74 students (82% of the total) had LSAT scores spread over a twelve point
LSAT range and UGPAs spread over a 1.6 UGPA range. The 16 students whose data
were excluded either had an LSAT score so low that they were admitted for
extraordinary reasons, or an LSAT score so high that they were accepted
automatically, with no meaningful admissions committee review.
The early study, relating to the fall 1992 entering students, was based upon
law school grades after one semester of study. For these students, the lowest LSAT
score average was for the bottom quartile and the second lowest was for the third
quartile. The highest LSAT average was for the second quartile and the second
highest was for the top quartile. However, the spread between the highest and
lowest LSAT score averages was a mere 1.6 LSAT points.
The highest UGPA average was for the bottom quartile, and the second
highest was for the second quartile. The third highest was for the first quartile and
the lowest UGPA average was for the third quartile. The spread between the highest
and lowest UGPA averages was 0.15. These mixed results and thin margins
between highest and lowest scores suggest, as was the case for the LSAT, very
limited, if any, predictive significance for the UGPA.
All of this could be viewed as reflecting slight positive correlation for the LSAT
and slight negative correlation for the UGPA. It also could be viewed as nearly
random correlation for both predictors.
The recent study relates to the 54 students of color who entered the Law
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My validity studies contradict the generally accepted view
that LSAT scores are valid predictors of minority student
success. I know of no reason why law students of color at
Touro Law Center, year after year, would not be typical of
students of color at most law schools. Therefore, I suggest
that my data indicate the need for similar validity studies to
be conducted at other law schools, with the studies to be
conducted by personnel at the law schools, not the LSAC.
What about the validity of the LSAT for law students in
general? The LSAC provides law schools with information
about the correlation between LSAT scores of their students
and the law school grades of these students. This correlation
is expressed as a coefficient of correlation, with a coefficient
of +1.0 reflecting perfect positive correlation (i.e., the higher
the LSAT score of a student, the higher the grades) and a
coefficient of 1.0 reflecting perfect negative correlation (i.e.,
the higher the LSAT score of a student, the lower the law
school grades). A coefficient of 0.0 reflects perfectly random
Center in the fall of 2000 and completed two semesters of study at the Law Center.
No student was admitted to this class whose LSAT score was in the low range that
indicates likely academic failure, and there were no students whose high scores were
likely to skew the statistical results. Therefore, all 54 students were included in the
study. These students were spread rather evenly along a 12 point LSAT range and a
1.7 UGPA range. They constituted 28% of the 196 students in their class, after two
semesters of study, and their two semester median law school grade point average
was 0.08 above the median for the entire class.
The evaluation of these students by quartile, based upon their grades after
two semesters of study, provides results that seem to be inconsistent with the
results discussed above for the students of color who entered the Law Center in the
fall of 1992. The bottom quartile had the highest LSAT score average, with the top
quartile coming in second, the third quartile coming in third, and the second quartile
coming in last. The spread between the highest LSAT score average and the lowest
was 2.1 points. The top quartile had the highest UGPA average, and the second
quartile had the second highest. The third quartile had the lowest UGPA average,
while the bottom quartile was second from the bottom. The spread between the
highest UGPA average and the lowest was 0.194.
The results for the fall 2000 entering class could be viewed as reflecting
slight negative correlation for the LSAT and slight positive correlation for the UGPA,
the reverse of the results for the students who entered in the fall of 1992. A better
view, I suggest, is that the correlations for both groups of students essentially are
random, or nearly random.
This random, or nearly random, correlation is
consistent with the results of other studies I have conducted for students of color
who entered the Law Center in other years.
If one were to place side-by-side the actual LSAT scores and UGPAs of
students in each quartile, for the fall 1992 and fall 2000 groups of entering students,
the students in each quartile would appear to be interchangeable, with roughly the
same number of low and high LSAT scores, roughly the same number of low and
high UGPAs, and roughly the same LSAT score/UGPA combinations in each quartile.
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correlation between LSAT scores and law school grades.
Reports by LSAC indicate that the LSAT, in general, for law
schools around the country, has a coefficient of correlation
with law school grades of about +0.4.66
Racial factors may artificially inflate the coefficients of
correlation the LSAC reports to law schools. When the LSAC
calculates the coefficient of correlation for the LSAT, it
includes students of color in the overall calculation. These
students, in general, have lower LSAT scores than white
students. At most law schools, they also have, in general,
lower grades than those of white students. However, the lower
grades of students of color at any particular law school have
little, if anything, to do with the skills tested by the LSAT.
Instead, they relate primarily to the race and culture-based
barriers faced by students of color at these law schools.
Inclusion of students of color in generalized calculations
of coefficients of correlation, between LSAT scores and law
school performance, artificially inflates the apparent validity
of the LSAT for all law students. That is, the relatively low
level of academic performance by students of color, combined
with their low LSAT scores, make the LSAT appear to be a
better predictor of likely success in law school for all
students, including white students. To insure accurate use
by law schools of LSAT scores, and to insure nondiscriminatory treatment of applicants of color, individual law
schools should conduct differential validation studies of the
LSAT. These validation studies would separately determine
LSAT validity for white students and for students of color,
and would permit proper use of LSAT scores if it is true, as it
appears, that the LSAT is a much better predictor of law
school success for white students than it is for students of
color."
66. "LSAC's recent predictive studies, which include almost all ABA-accredited
law schools, suggest that the median correlation between the LSAT and FYAs is
about +.40." William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
Differences in EducationalAttainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College
Students, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1090 ((2001). For Kidder's sources see id. at 1090
n.155.
67. Differential validation applied to employment tests has been endorsed by
guidelines of the U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and by the U. S.
Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In
Albemarle, the Court concluded that the defendant failed to prove job relatedness of
its employment screening tests, in part, because it failed to differentially validate the
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If low LSAT scores have limited connection to poor
academic performance by many law students of color, what is
connected to this poor performance? We've talked about
limited access during the first year to information from other
students about the basics of class preparation, exam
preparation, and exam taking. Other problems students of
color experience include difficulty gaining access to study
groups, and undermining treatment in some classrooms that
differs from treatment given to white students, sometimes in
the form of not being called upon because of a professor's
concern that the student of color will not be able to respond
effectively. Some white students and faculty members oppose
organizations like the Black Law Students Association (BLSA)
because they are perceived by whites to be racist
organizations that discriminate against whites. Connected to
this, students of color are mistakenly accused of selfsegregation. Of great significance, a student of color can
experience intellectual inhibition when he or she is
surrounded by people who believe he or she is intellectually
unqualified to be in law school and make that belief known in
various ways. Overt and subtle racial insults and exclusion
are experienced by students of color on a regular basis at
many, if not most, American law schools. If one uses an
analogy to sexual harassment doctrine, the hostile
environments facing many law students of color at many, if
not most, American law schools are sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of their education and create
tests.

In his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell wrote: "The EEOC Guidelines

likewise provide that '(d)ata must be generated and results separately reported for
minority and nonminority groups wherever technically feasible."' Id. at 435. (quoting
29 C.F.R. §1607.5(b)(5)).

The rationale for differential validation was discussed by

Justice Brennan in his opinion for four members of the Court in Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978):
In Albemarle, we approved "differential validation" of employment tests. That
procedure requires that an employer must ensure that a test score of, for
example, 50 for a minority job applicant means the same thing as a score of
50 for a nonminority applicant. By implication, were it determined that a
test score of 50 for a minority corresponds in "potential for employment" to a
60 for whites, the test could not be used consistently with Title VII unless
the employer hired minorities with scores of 50 even though he might not
hire nonminority applicants with scores above 50 but below 60. Thus, it is
clear that employers, to ensure equal opportunity, may have to adopt raceconscious hiring practices."
Id. at 364 n.37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
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an abusive educational environment.
Most law students of color pass three or four years of law
school with the quality of their education undermined by
social and educational isolation, and by a generally hostile
educational environment imposed upon them, for the most
part, by white students. Although many, if not most, law
students face financial difficulties, students of color tend to
face financial stress that is greater than that faced by white
law students.6 9
These factors affect students of color from different racial
and cultural groups in somewhat different ways. But the
overall result is that students of color often graduate from
law school with a legal education that is inferior to the legal
education they would have received had they been white,
attending the same law school. They then, not surprisingly,
have lower first time bar exam pass rates than white
graduates, and these lower bar exam pass rates are held out
as evidence that the students of color were not fully qualified
to be admitted to law school in the first place.
Steps law schools take to correct these forms of
discrimination are not affirmative actions steps. Rather, they
are corrections for current discrimination. I suggest that they
are remedial steps a law school may need to take to avoid
violation of the disparate treatment prohibitions of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,70 and insure compliance with the
disparate impact requirements imposed upon law schools, as
recipients of federal financial assistance, by Title VI regulations promulgated by the U. S. Department of Education.7
Of at least equal importance to law school deans, if a
law school administration knows, or has reason to know, of a
racially hostile environment that undermines the legal
education received by students of color, the law school may
68. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
69. During the question and answer portion of the Section Program, Professor
Cynthia Nance, of the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, discussed the overwhelming financial obligations and stress often faced by law students of color.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the
Supreme Court confirmed that Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination by
recipients of federal financial assistance. Id. at 293 & nn.7 & 8. In this regard, the
Court relied upon its earlier decision in GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service Conn'n of
the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 607-08 (1983).
71. 34 CFR. § 100.3(b)(2) (2002).
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be obligated to take corrective action to avoid violation of
American Bar Association accreditation requirements"2 and
Association of American Law Schools membership requirements."
72. The American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar, Standards for Approval of Law Schools, contain Standard 210(a) which
provides that: "A law school shall foster and maintain equality of opportunity in legal
education. . .without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, or sexual orientation." Standard 211, titled "Equal
Opportunity Effort," provides:
Consistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, a law
school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by concrete
action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the study of law and
entry into the profession by qualified members of groups, notably racial and
ethnic minorities, which have been victims of discrimination in various
forms.
This commitment typically includes a special concern for
determining the potential of these applicants through the admission
process...
Standard 211, Interpretation 211-1, provides, in relevant part:
Among the kinds of actions that can demonstrate a school's commitment to
providing equal opportunities for the study of law and entry into the
profession by qualified members of groups that have been the victims of
discrimination are the following ...
f. Creating a more favorable law school environment for minority students
by providing academic support services, supporting minority student
organizations, promoting contacts with minority lawyers, and hiring minority
administrators. (August 1997)
Standard 211, Interpretation 211-2, provides:
Each ABA approved law school (1) shall prepare a written plan describing its
current program and the efforts it intends to undertake relating to
compliance with Standard 211, and (2) maintain a current file which will
include the specific actions which have been taken by the school to comply
with its stated plan.
ABA SEC. LEG. EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW

-

SCHOOLS ch. 2, available at <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/
chapter2.html> (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
73. "A member school shall provide equality of opportunity in legal education for
all persons, including . . applicants for admission, enrolled students, and
graduates, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, handicap or disability, or sexual orientation. . ."
ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS, BYLAWS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS, § 6-4(a)
(2000), available at <http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html> (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
The Association's "Statement on Diversity, Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action"
provides, in relevant part:
AALS' commitment to equality of opportunity and diversity reflects the
judgment of the member schools that these are core values in legal
education and in the legal profession. The objective reaches beyond simply
ensuring access to all who are qualified. It seeks to increase the number of
persons from underrepresented groups in law schools, in the legal profession
and in the judiciary in order to enhance the perception of fairness in the
legal system, to secure legal services to all sectors of society, and to provide
role models for young people.
Diversity means more, however, than expanding access to those
historically underrepresented in and underserved by legal education and the
legal profession. Its objective is also to create an educational community
and ultimately a profession - that incorporates the different perspectives
necessary to a more comprehensive understanding of the law and its impact

176

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:129

Law school deans should ask their students of color and
professors of color what the specific racial and cultural
barriers are that exist at their law schools, so that corrective
steps can be taken. They also should develop empirical data
concerning these barriers so that they can defend themselves
if they are challenged when they implement remedial
programs. And they need to eliminate not only intentional
discrimination, but disparate impact discrimination as well,
including that which occurs in the admissions process
through misuse of the LSAT.
William Kidder recently published his study on LSAT
racial bias in the Califomia Law Review.7 4 He compared
groups of people who are white, African American, Asian, and
Latino/Latina, and who had "roughly equal educational
attainment over their college years."7 The persons of color
were comparable to the whites in "terms of UGPA, graduation
date,

and

institution attended."7 6

Despite

this academic

comparability, the African-Americans scored, on average, 9.2
LSAT points lower than the whites, the Latino/Latinas
scored, on average, 6.8 LSAT points lower than the whites,
and the Asians scored, on average, 2.5 LSAT points lower
than the whites.77 This study by Kidder reveals racial and
cultural bias built into the LSAT, bias that leads to the
rejection by many, if not most, American law schools of
talented and fully qualified applicants of color. This
institutionalized system implements an invidious race-based
preference in favor of whites, a preference that is built into
the law school admission process by the Law School
Admission Council.
This is my last point. In Hopwood v. State of Texas," the
focus of the litigation, and related commentary, was on
on society; and to assure vigorous intellectual interchanges essential for
professional development. It also implies changing the culture of educational
institutions - making learning, the curriculum, and pedagogy more
responsive to the needs of a changing student population and a changing
world. It presumes an obligation to create a greater sense of belonging, of
connectedness, and of place for all members of the educational community.
(Adopted by the Executive Committee, November 1995).
74. Kidder, supranote 66.
75. Id. at 1073.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1074.
78. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest that
justifies the preferential use of race in law school
admissions. 9 I suggest that we should look deeper into the
case. The Fifth Circuit panel believed that the rejected whites
were more qualified than the African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans who were accepted. But what was their
basis for their belief? They relied upon the Texas Index,
which was used by the University of Texas Law School in its
admission decisions. The Texas Index gave sixty percent
weight to LSAT scores and forty percent weight to
undergraduate grade point averages.o Cheryl Hopwood and
her co-plaintiffs seemed to be more qualified than the
African-Americans and Mexican-Americans, in large part,
because of the race-based preference for white people built
into the LSAT. This is the racial preference in law school
admissions that we should recognize and talk about, and this
is the racial preference we should end. Thank you.
RACE AND COMPETENCE IN THE ACADEMY
Professor Vicki Schultz*: Today I want like to discuss
the connections between race and competence in the
academy (and other institutions where work goes on). As
some of you know, I have been working in recent years to
develop a new understanding of the hostility and
marginalization that confronts women and many men in the
workplace. In this new understanding, the problem is not
simply unwanted sexual advances, but rather a whole range
of exclusionary behaviors that mark some people as
"different" and inferior based on their sex or gender. In my
79. In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit panel held that the affirmative action
admissions program of the University of Texas School of Law violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides, in relevant part:
"No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The court wrote: 'We agree with the plaintiffs
that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 78 F.3d at 944. The Fifth Circuit panel thus rejected the conclusion
of Justice Powell, in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
311-15 (1978), that achieving diversity is a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment, sufficient to justify a properly tailored race-conscious medical school
admission program.
80. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935 & nL.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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view, sex harassment isn't best understood as an effort by
men to extract sexual services from women. Rather, it's a
mechanism for some members of a dominant sex/gender
group (often men) to preserve their superior status by
engaging in actions that brand the outsiders as less
competent. Often, as I have shown, these actions will not be
sexually explicit in nature; work sabotage and snubbing are
common weapons of harassment. Through such actions, the
dominants claim excellence for themselves and preserve their
sense of themselves as "better than" those they harass.'
Being on this panel has given me a chance to think about
whether this competence-based model helps us think about
how race operates in the academy. Although I have not done
comprehensive research on this question, it seems to me that
a competence-based model does help. As a number of the
panelists here today have emphasized, part of what it means
to be a person of color in America is to be someone who is
viewed as not as good at what one does. This negative view
affects both law faculty and students, for whom law school is,
after all, a kind of workplace. Professor Scherer spoke
eloquently about the "false and pernicious belief in the limited
academic ability of most . .. students of color."8 2
In his
words, "[M]any, if not most, law professors and deans believe
that students of color have writing, reasoning, and motivation
problems." 8 3 Professor Iglesias talked about the petty
"micropolitics"8 4 of the academy - the processes through
which some people come to be subject to very rigorous
scrutiny while others are not. Professor Carbado analyzed the
pressure on professors of color to perform what he calls
"shadow racial labor" in order to disconfirm negative racial
stereotypes.
In many academic environments, it will be difficult or
impossible to disconfirm those negative stereotypes. It won't
always work to try to assimilate to the dominant norms of the
institution, because structural features of the institution or
81. See Vicki Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J. L. & POL'Y 417 (2000);
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
82. See supra p.168.
83. Id.
84. See supra p. 131.
85. See supra p.148.

2002]1

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE ACADEMY

179

-

the micropolitics of day-to-day interaction will prevent
successful assimilation. In Professor Scherer's analysis, for
example, the LSAT is a structural feature of the law school
world that prevents successful assimilation. Those who enter
with lower scores are regarded as less competent and less
capable from the start. These negative stereotypes foster low
expectations and negative treatment by others, and can also
trigger an internal sense of what Professor Claude Steele has
referred to as "stereotype threat" on the part of the students
of color," that can actually sabotage successful performance.
Even people who succeed against the odds do not necessarily
disconfirm the stereotypes. Social psychologists have shown
that if members of outgroups do poorly, their performance is
attributed to their group's inferiority; but if they do well, their
performance is written off as a function of luck. 7 It seems
that, all too often, whatever is defined as excellent, women
and men of color are defined as not that.
When we consider the historical record, it should not be
surprising that this is such an important part of the
dynamics of racial exclusion and hierarchy. From the very
beginning, African-Americans have been relegated to work
considered socially undesirable on the ground of their alleged
lack of competence. Slavery, after all, involved forcing slaves
to labor for others' benefit at work whites thought they were
too good to do; the system was defended on the ground that
such labor was all slaves were suited (morally, intellectually,
physically) to do. Slavery appropriated African-Americans'
work on an economic level and devalued it on a social level
despite their enormous contribution to the nation's
productivity. Over time, structural features of the American
labor market such as job segregation by race, massive
unemployment and underemployment,
and race-based
harassment have carried forward this historical legacy of
denigrating the capacities and contributions of people of
color.

&

86. See Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black College Students,
THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, Aug. 1999, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/
99aug.9908streotype.htm> (last visited Sept. 20, 2002); Thomas F. Pettigrew
Joanne Martin. Shaping the OrganizationalContext for Black-American Inclusion, 43
J. SOC. ISSUES 41, 53-54 (1987).
87. See Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 86, at 62-64.
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Many of you know perhaps better than I do what the
devaluation of competence along racial lines looks like, and
some of today's panelists have spoken powerfully about it.
Here I'll simply mention a few factors that seem to me to be
important.
First, there is the politics of affirmative action in faculty
hiring. What is happening right now in American law schools
on the hiring front is so depressing. When I first began
teaching at the University of Wisconsin, most of the people I
knew didn't see affirmative action as a system for granting
preferences to people who were less qualified. They saw it,
instead, as a device to help ensure that they did not slip into
making the biased judgments that often occur when
evaluating people on such necessarily elusive criteria as
excellence in scholarship and teaching. Today, prevailing
views about affirmative action are quite different. The
"preference" view holds sway, with a vengeance, even among
many who defend affirmative action. Among others, the
demand for affirmative action has given way to a demand for
diversity - a move which discards the discourse of antidiscrimination and defends race- and gender-based hiring on
the ground that hiring more women and men of color will
enhance productivity. Regardless of whether this may be true
in some circumstances, this way of conceptualizing things
relieves institutions of the obligation to consider whether bias
haunts their histories or inhabits their current selection
processes. In such a climate, it becomes difficult to honestly
confront the institution's racial dynamics. As Professor
Carbado has told us, faculty of color can be penalized for
trying to do so. Even as a white person, you can become
marginalized for raising issues of race or gender
discrimination. In fact, if you dare to introduce a candidate's
race or gender as an issue, you risk harming them, for
research suggests that attention to such matters can set in
motion a cognitive bias that negatively affects those who are
being evaluated.
Second, there is a devaluation of courses, fields of
research, and schools of thought that are seen as associated
with "minority" or "women's" concerns. In the law school
world, for example, feminist theory and critical race theory
simply don't carry the same prestige as analytical
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jurisprudence or law and economics. This same process of
devaluation affects core courses. I was shocked to be
informed recently by an influential senior scholar (at another
law school) that I couldn't really expect to draw many
students into a course on employment discrimination, as
opposed to employment law, because discrimination is simply
not of general interest.
I almost fell over when another
colleague informed me that the entire field of labor and
employment law has come to be regarded as a "woman's"
specialty. Only a decade ago, employment discrimination was
viewed as a vital part of labor and employment law and the
whole field was regarded as rather macho. Now I'm told that
employment discrimination has overtaken family law as the
new pink ghetto of the law school world. Maybe Professor
Arlie Hoschild is right, and work really has become home."
Or maybe the new identification of employment law as a
woman's field simply illustrates the fluidity and arbitrariness
of the cultural determinations of particular fields of endeavor
as gender - and race-typed."9
The third, and most painful, thing I want to discuss is the
devaluation and marginalization of the contributions and
capacities of people of color themselves. In academic settings,
many whites assume that people of color are there only
because of affirmative action. The view of affirmative action
as "preference" brings with it many negative assumptions,
"the most important of [which] is the assumption of
incompetence"9 0 on the part of its beneficiaries. This assumption affects the treatment of people of color at an intellectual
level, by biasing evaluations of their scholarship and
teaching. It also affects their treatment at a social level, by
excluding them from the informal networks that are sites of
knowledge and power in the institution. You know these
networks: the groups of people who regularly go to lunch
together, who teach courses and run workshops together,
who brainstorm about ideas and projects together, who write
88.

See ARLIE RUSSELL HOSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND

HOME BECOMES WORK (1997).

89. I have written about this phenomenon elsewhere. See Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1750
(1990).
90. Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 86, at 57.
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articles and books together, who invite each other to their
homes after hours - the people who make the decisions that
really affect the school. People of color are rarely included in
these insider networks.
It isn't only faculty members who are marginalized and
devalued. As a number of the panelists here today have
noted, the negative stereotyping of the capacities of students
of color also contributes significantly to the culture of racial
bias within academic institutions. Students are the talent
pool for creating professors. All too often, students of color
receive the message that they simply aren't good enough to
aspire to an academic career. I am sure many of us have
heartbreaking examples of this phenomenon. Once, when I
was interviewing a randomly selected group of students to
solicit their views about a visiting professor, I met a Native
American student who had never taken a class with me. A
few moments into the interview, the student shut the door to
my office and spoke in a voice that signaled he was close to
tears. He said he had come to our law school because he
hoped to become a law professor, and a Native American
professor in his home state had told him that Yale produced
more law teachers than any other place. The student had
high hopes for his future when he arrived. But, despite the
fact that one needs faculty connections to get launched into
an academic career, this student had never had personal
contact with a single regular member of the faculty until I
called him in to talk to me. True, he could have sought out
faculty contact on his own. But he hadn't done so because
no one had sent him the signal that he was bright and
talented - a signal that could have helped him overcome his
sense of intimidation about approaching a faculty member.
At a law school that prides itself on faculty/student relations,
this student felt completely debilitated by his law school
experience. We simply can't afford to throw people away like
that.
My final (and perhaps more controversial) point has to do
with the marginalization of whites who associate themselves
with the interests of people of color. When we think about
how to make academic environments more hospitable to
people of color, one strategy is to increase their numbers.
Numbers matter. The literature suggests that the dynamics
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of group-based exclusion and hostility arise (or at least are
heightened) in the context of what sociologists call skewed
ratios: situations in which one group so dominates another
numerically that it has the power to control the culture and
to treat members of the minority group as symbolic
representatives of their group rather than as individuals. It is
only when the minority group members are present in
numbers that begin to approach balance (around 35 or 40
percent) that they have the capacity to affect the culture by
making alliances with each other and forming coalitions with
others.9 ' In thinking about gender, these dynamics are not so
disheartening, because the fact that women are 50 percent of
the population means it's at least theoretically possible to
imagine increasing women's numerical presence to an extent
that could give them real power. When it comes to race, the
situation is more difficult, because, for many racial and
ethnic groups, their numbers simply are not large enough to
make a difference. This means that many minority groups
can only hope to change inhospitable cultures by building
alliances with others. In some institutions, they will be able
to reach out to other minorities, but this strategy won't
always be possible or fruitful. I don't think members of
minority groups should write off the possibility of reaching
out to sympathetic whites - just as I don't think women
should write off the possibility of reaching out to sympathetic
men - in an effort to build cross-gender, cross-racial
networks of support and solidarity.
Can the law help? I agree with Dean Perschbacher that
the law matters less than leadership, but I think leadership
responds best to bottom-up initiatives and the law can help
in mobilizing those initiatives. Let's consider what might be
done through harassment law.
If the Title VII claim for hostile work environment
harassment is to have any relevance, it must embody more
than a narrow definition of racial harassment that envisions
overt expressions of racial animus or stereotyping. We must
work to broaden the concept to encompass all the everyday,
micro-level interactions through which members of the
91. See RosABETH Moss
(1977).
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minority group become labeled and treated as less competent.
Just as it is too narrow to conceptualize sex harassment in
terms of overt sexual advances, so too is it too narrow to
conceptualize racial harassment in terms of explicitly racial
epithets. Racially inhospitable environments don't always
involve someone using the "N" word; they involve an
aggregation of day-to-day actions that subtly denigrate the
accomplishments and capacities of people along racial/ethnic
lines. The courts need to be educated about these dynamics,
and legal scholarship can make a difference. I hope you
won't think I'm too immodest if I confess that I have been
astonished at (and humbled by) the degree to which some of
my own scholarship has been working its way into judicial
consciousness. Recently, a few lower courts have cited me in
support of creating a broader concept of hostile work
environment harassment that recognizes the full breath of
the gender-based harassment that many women face.9 2 There
have even been a couple of good race discrimination
decisions, including one that acknowledges explicitly that
part of what it means to create a racially hostile work
environment is to demean someone's competence based on
their race.9
In fact, there is a growing body of scholarship by younger
legal scholars that seeks to change the entire paradigm for
how we understand discrimination. This work could make a
big difference if we could bring it to the attention of judges
and managers, perhaps through expert witnesses and
consultants. Consider, for example, that under the
conventional definition of discrimination, an employer isn't
guilty of sex discrimination if the firm treats men of color just
as badly as women. The employer can argue that it isn't
engaging in sex discrimination because it's doing the same
thing to the men, too (who just happen to be men of color).
This way of thinking has been challenged by Professor Clark
Freshman,9 4 who argues that discrimination shouldn't be
92. See, e.g., Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001); Durham Life
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1999).
93. Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 262 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment).
94. See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-semitism? How Social
Science Theories Identify Discriminationand Promote Coalitions Between "Different"
Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 313 (2000); Clark Freshman, Beyond Atomized
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viewed as animus against a particular group but rather as a
preference for one's one group; this preference might lead
those who hold it to discriminate against any or all groups
who are not part of their inner circle. Professor Ann
McGinley, who is in the audience here today, has analyzed
If this body of work were
discrimination in similar terms.
taken as seriously as it should be, evidence that an
institution has treated members of other non-preferred
groups just as badly as it treated the plaintiffs group would
not constitute a defense, but rather would count against an
employer.
On a related note, there is a genuine need to revise the
law to ensure that institutions cannot penalize members of
the dominant group who reach across race or gender
boundaries to promote the interests of those who are not
members of their own group. There are some appalling
developments in the law of retaliation that make it harder for
such people to obtain legal protection.9 6 We need to eliminate
those barriers, but perhaps we should be even bolder and
establish new forms of legal protection that actively
encourage acts of cross-gender, cross-racial solidarity. Noah
Zatz recently published an article" that maps out one
important new legal strategy. Mr. Zatz begins by discussing
the Childresscase," in which some white male police officers
in Richmond, Virginia were fired because they protested their
lieutenant's harassment and denigration of their female and
black colleagues (many of whom were women of color). The
white male officers claimed that the lieutenant's harassment
Discrimination: Use of Acts of Discrimination Against "Other" Minorities to Prove
Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal Employment Law, 43 STAN. L. REv. 241
(1990).
95. See Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evoluicionl: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir.
1997) (barring a retaliation claim on the ground that no ultimate employment
decision was involved where the alleged retaliation consisted of an investigatory visit
to the plaintiffs home by her supervisor, a reprimand for being away from her desk,
negative performance reviews that resulted in a missed pay increase, an
intensification of work from her supervisors, and hostility and false reports of
problems with her work from her coworkers).
97. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002).
98. Childress v. City of Richmond, 919 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134
F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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of the others undermined safety, because it threatened to
generate gender- and race-based mistrust that could destroy
the sense of teamwork that partners in law enforcement need
to work together effectively. The white men filed suit alleging
hostile work environment on behalf of their harassed
partners, but the Fourth Circuit held that they lacked
standing; they also lost on their retaliation claim. Mr. Zatz
argues that, in addition to these traditional approaches, the
law should permit the men to bring a hostile work
environment claim of their own. Zatz shows how in firing the
men for protesting the discriminatory treatment of their
female partners, the department was punishing them for
refusing to conform to the lieutenant's image of who "white
men" are supposed to be: people who will acquiesce in race
and sex discrimination against their colleagues. The law
should protect people's ability to act in accordance with their
own sense of themselves as non-discriminators instead.
Such acts of self-definition and solidarity have been
important to the development of Title VII law from the
beginning. Indeed, the very first case to recognize a cause of
action for hostile work environment harassment arose out of
such a gesture. In Rogers v. EEOC,99 a Mexican-American
employee, Josephine Chavez, alleged that her optometrist
employers had engaged in national origin discrimination by
segregating its patients along racial/ethnic lines.The
optometrists argued that Josephine Chavez couldn't possibly
have a Title VII claim, because the discrimination was
directed toward the patients and not toward herself or any
employee. Thus, "Mrs. Chavez cannot complain that she is
treated any differently than any other employee." 00 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument, implicitly recognizing that
Mrs. Chavez might so identify with the patients that
discrimination against them would negatively affect her. In
the process of doing so, the court crafted the language that
laid out the conceptual underpinnings for the claim we now
10
know as hostile work environment harassment."o
99. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. ("One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
minority group workers, and. .. Title VII is aimed at the eradication of such noxious
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Legal changes can make a difference in helping us put
together coalitions to fight for genuine inclusion in the
academy and other workplaces.
But the real campaign
doesn't lie in the courts; it lies in the hallways. We must
come together at the grass-roots level to create a movement
around these issues, because the legal system is only
responsive - and, frankly, Dean Perschbacher, I think even
institutions are only responsive at more than a superficial
level - when the people who are being affected come together
to demand change. We live in a time when conservative ideas
and politics have a great deal of influence, but there are some
hopeful signs of youth-based, grass-roots initiatives to
challenge the status quo. If you look around the country to
see what issues college students care most deeply about, it is
labor and discrimination issues. Students all over the country
(including my own law school) are engaged in serious
initiatives to increase the ranks of women and men of color
on their faculties. But students are also protesting things
that don't as directly affect their own self-interest. They are
mobilizing to end sweatshop labor and child labor around the
globe. They are mobilizing in support of union organizing
campaigns on their campuses. They are mobilizing to demand
that their universities pay living wages to all their employees.
Perhaps it is time for faculty members - people like you
and me - to join our students in these efforts to achieve
change. If we consider some of the exciting initiatives that
are occurring around the country, and we consider how we as
faculty might align our interests not only with other faculty
and students but also with people like low-wage employees
who are predominantly people of color, we can envision
genuine change. The law can be mobilized in this effort. If
it's a hostile work environment for Josephine Chavez to have
to work in a place where her patients were segregated along
racial/ethnic lines, then maybe it's a hostile environment for
us to have to work in a place where our colleagues and
students of color are treated as less competent, or where
most of the people of color work as custodians and are
dramatically underpaid. These arguments may not prevail in
the courts, but winning legal victories isn't really the point.
practices.")
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The point is to invest the law with the kind of meaning that
will help us come together and aspire to be our best selves.
Law is at its best when it is mobilized in this aspirational way
to help us articulate and dream of a better world.
So, in our examination of the Ivory Tower, I would like to
urge that all of us think across lines of race, lines of gender,
lines of class, to allow our hearts and minds to connect with
the common humanity, the important contributions, and the
concrete problems of those we don't always see as members
of our own groups. Let us not forget those at the bottom. The
wages of those who feed and clean up after us have declined
significantly in recent years.1 This is not surprising, for over
the past twenty years or so, the earnings and job security of
almost all but the most elite workers have declined
Many Americans find themselves in
dramatically.' 03
desperate straights. The only hope is for all of us to come
together and create a broad social movement that transcends
traditional forms of identity politics and demands broadbased political and economic change.' 4 Although we cannot
escape thinking of ourselves in gender or race-based terms as
long as other people do so, we can struggle to identify with
each other across race and gender boundaries and imagine
ourselves as part of a larger community of people who
deserve both equality and social justice.
02
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May 4, 2000, available at <http:www.provost, harvard.edu/adhoc> (last visited June
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103. For a summary of these trends, see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1881, 1924-27 (2000).
104. For a more elaborate version of this argument, see id. at 1928-64.
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